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Abstract. The received view in the history of the philosophy of psychology is that the logical 
positivists—Carnap and Hempel in particular—endorsed the position commonly known as 
“logical” or “analytical” behaviourism, according to which the relations between 
psychological statements and the physical-behavioural statements intended to give their 
meaning are analytic and knowable a priori. This chapter argues that this is sheer legend: 
most, if not all, such relations were viewed by the logical positivists as synthetic and 
knowable only a posteriori. It then traces the origins of the legend to the logical positivists’ 
idiosyncratic extensional or at best weakly intensional use of what are now considered 
crucially strongly intensional semantic notions, such as “translation,” “meaning” and their 
cognates, focussing on a particular instance of this latter phenomenon, arguing that a 
conflation of explicit definition and analyticity may be the chief source of the legend.  
 
 
1. The Legend 
Near the beginning of his recent Carnapian book Constructing the World, David 
Chalmers rightly remarks that “A surprising and often-overlooked feature of the 
Aufbau is that Carnap there requires only that definitions be extensionally adequate” 
(Chalmers 2012, p. 4). Chalmers then points out that in the 1961 preface to the second 
edition of the Aufbau (Carnap 1928/1961), Carnap “says that the definitions should be 
held to a stronger, intensional, criterion of adequacy” (Chalmers 2012, p. 5). 
Chalmers goes on to give “analyticity, apriority and necessity” as examples of 
stronger criteria (obviously intending the necessity in question to be logical or 
metaphysical necessity). It is clear from the preface, however, that Carnap did not 
demand such strongly intensional criteria, but only that the coextensiveness of the 
definiendum and definiens not be merely “accidental, but necessary, i.e., it must rest 
either on the basis of logical rules or on the basis of natural laws” (Carnap 1928/1961, 
                                                
* Dedicated to the memory of Rachel Jardine.  
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p. ix).1 Since natural laws are obviously not analytic or knowable a priori, it is clear 
that Carnap did not think that all philosophical definitions are required to meet the 
very strong modal criteria of intensionality that Chalmers requires for his 
constructional project. Hannes Leitgeb (2011, pp. 267, 269-270) also draws attention 
to the extra demand stated by Carnap in the preface, but, unlike Chalmers, notes 
explicitly that the intensionality in question may be merely one of nomological 
necessity. However, it is important to note — and this something that neither 
Chalmers nor Leitgeb mention, as they are concerned solely with exploring the 
possibility of actually carrying off a suitably revised Aufbau-like construction project 
— that the stronger requirement of some degree of intensional adequacy for 
definitions is acknowledged by Carnap very soon after the Aufbau.  
Just such an intensional adequacy condition on definitions short of analyticity (and 
hence a priority) finds expression, for example, four years later in Unity of Science 
(Carnap 1932). One of the aims of that work is to show that protocol sentences about 
subjective experience can be physicalized, that is, translated into sentences employing 
only physical vocabulary (which is the only vocabulary known to be inter-subjective, 
inter-sensory, and universal, which are the requirements for any suitable confirmation 
base for empirical science). It is evident that Carnap there envisages such 
“translations” to be based partly on natural laws and hence neither logically necessary 
nor analytically true nor knowable a priori. The same is true of the broader goal of 
physicalizing the science of psychology (one element of unified science). The 
proposed physical definitions of psychological terms and physical translations of 
psychological sentences are required to meet (to borrow Chalmers’ apt phrase) 
stronger-than-extensional conditions of adequacy — but, contrary to Chalmers’s own 
constructional requirements, only up to nomological intensionality. That is to say, the 
proposal is that it is only nomologically necessary that the physical definiens and the 
psychological definiendum have the same extension, not logically necessary (let alone 
that the two be synonymous).  
                                                
1 Carnap also refers the reader to his reply to Goodman in the Schilpp volume (Carnap 1963b) where 
he says that the identity of extension must fulfill an additional requirement, which “consists in the 
condition that the correspondence hold, not merely accidentally, but on the basis of general regularities, 
e.g., physical laws or empirical generalizations” (p. 946). 
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Just as the original extensionality of the Aufbau construction is often overlooked2, 
it is an virtually universally overlooked feature of Carnap’s philosophy of psychology 
of the 1930s — the period in which he is alleged to have been a logical behaviourist 
— that his proposed physical-behavioural definitions of mental terms are only 
required to be intensionally adequate up to nomologicality— which means, contrary 
to popular belief, that Carnap was not a logical behaviourist. In so far as Hempel and 
fellow logical positivists agreed with Carnap on this, which they certainly seemed to, 
an even more general claim is warranted, namely, that the logical positivists were not 
logical behaviourists.  
Yet Carnap and Hempel and their fellow logical positivists are considered to be 
examples of logical behaviourists par excellence. For example, in his celebrated 1963 
critique of logical behaviourism, “Brains and Behaviour”, Hilary Putnam wrote that 
 
“the Vienna positivists in their ‘physicalist’ phase (about 1930) … [produced] the doctrine 
we are calling logical behaviourism—the doctrine that, just as numbers are (allegedly) 
logical constructions out of sets, so mental events are logical constructions out of actual 
and possible behaviour events” (Putnam 1963, p. 326).  
 
Logical behaviourism so understood was an “extreme thesis” implying that “all talk 
about mental events is translatable into talk about actual or overt potential behaviour” 
(ibidem.). Putnam then claimed that “In the last thirty years, the original extreme 
thesis of logical behaviourism has gradually been weakened to something” which, he 
said, “a great many” philosophers at the time would have accepted. The central tenet 
of the weakened thesis is that “[t]here exist entailments between mind-statements and 
behaviour-statements; entailments that are not perhaps analytic in the way that ‘All bachelors 
are married’ is analytic, but that nevertheless follow (in some sense) from the meanings of 
mind words” (id., p. 327).  Putnam proposed to call these entailments “analytic 
entailments.”3 He eventually went on, of course, to offer the undergraduate 
philosophy student’s favourite refutation of logical behaviourism: the fictional 
community of “super-spartans” (or “super-stoics”). These legendary people, as 
everyone knows, are capable of suppressing all pain behaviour even while suffering 
“the agonies of the damned”—thus supposedly demonstrating that the connection 
                                                
2 Even by Quine, to some extent, for as Nelson Goodman (1963, p. 555n5) has pointed out, “The 
avowed extensionalism of so outstanding a monument of phenomenalism and constructionism as the 
Aufbau would seem to confute Quine’s recent charge [in ‘Two Dogmas’] that the notion of analyticity 
is a ‘holdover of phenomenalistic reductionism’.” 
3 Cf. (Putnam 1969).  
 4 
between statements about pain and statements about pain behaviour cannot be a 
matter of analytic meaning equivalence or even one-way analytic entailment of any 
kind. The connection between the two is at best entirely synthetic—or, as we would 
put it nowadays, contingent.  
As anyone familiar with philosophy of mind textbooks and anthology introductions 
can attest to, Putnam’s understanding of the logical positivists’ logical behaviourism 
is the orthodox one in the analytic tradition and continues to be so. Forty years later, 
for example, we find John Searle characterizing logical behaviourism as “a logical 
thesis about the definition of mental concepts. … The model for the behaviourists was one of 
definitional identities. Pains are dispositions to behaviour in a way that triangles are three-
sided plane figures. In each case it is a matter of definition” (2004, pp. 54-5), and citing C. 
G. Hempel as an example of a philosopher endorsing this kind of behaviourism.4 
Since the “definitional identities” Searle refers to, as well as Putnam’s “analytic 
entailments,” are supposed to be knowable a priori, it follows that the analyses or 
translations or entailments proposed by logical behaviourists, as holding between 
psychological statements and behavioural statements, are supposed to be knowable a 
priori. We can, then, sum up the received view in analytic philosophy of the logical 
positivists’ logical behaviourism as the thesis that the relation between psychological 
statements and the behavioural statements intended to give their meaning is an a 
priori knowable analytic entailment or equivalence. This is of course why logical 
behaviourism is also known as “analytical behaviourism.”  
As I have already suggested, when one turns to the two canonical logical positivist 
texts of logical behaviourism, one finds a very different story. Neither Rudolf 
Carnap’s “Psychology in Physical Language” (1932) nor C. G. Hempel’s “The 
Logical Analysis of Psychology” (1935) espouses the received view of logical 
behaviourism just adumbrated; nor do any of their subsequent writings on philosophy 
of psychology. First, neither Carnap nor Hempel restrict their reductive analyses of 
psychological statements to statements describing behaviour; on the contrary, they 
both included in their analyses reference to internal neurophysiological states. 
Secondly, in the eyes of both Carnap and Hempel, most of the logico-semantic 
relations between psychological statements and both the behavioural statements and 
                                                
4 Soon after Putnam, similar claims were be made by Fodor (1968, pp. 51, 155n6), Cornman (1971, pp. 
132ff, esp. p. 140), and Kim (1971, p. 328). 
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the physical statements intended to give their meanings are synthetic and knowable 
only a posteriori.  
Let us call the historical claim that the logical positivists maintained that the 
connections between “mind talk” and “behaviour talk,” or between “mind talk” and 
“physical-thing talk,” were analytic, the analytic entailment interpretation of logical 
positivism’s logical behaviourism. The fact is that the analytic entailment 
interpretation is as much a fiction as Putnam’s super-spartans. But if so, how did this 
extraordinary and ubiquitous legend get perpetuated throughout the analytic tradition? 
My chief aim here is to try to make some progress toward answering this question. I 
shall first establish (in §2) that the analytic entailment interpretation is indeed nothing 
more than a legend.5 Second (in §3), I will make some conjectures about why it 
became so widely accepted.  
 
2. Laying the Legend to Rest 
In his Physicalist writings of the 1930s Carnap refers to “rules of transformation” 
(sometimes “rules of inference” and “rules of translation”) of the physical language in 
which definitions and translations are to be carried out in accordance with the 
programme of Unified Science. Although he is not always entirely explicit about it, it 
is evident to a careful reader that even in the earliest of these writings from his 
Physicalist phase that not all of these inference rules are laws of logic and that some 
of them are intended to be laws of nature. For example, in ‘Unity of Science’ 
(1932/1934) Carnap writes of the “the rules of transformation inside the physical 
language (including the system of natural laws)” (p. 88, my emphasis; cf. p. 92). This 
becomes much clearer by the time of The Logical Syntax of Language (1934) and 
‘Testability and Meaning’ (1936-37) in which Carnap explicitly distinguishes 
between the L-rules and the P-rules of a scientific language on the basis of which 
transformations may be validly carried out: the former are logical laws and the latter 
empirical physical laws. (Carnap also defines various correlative notions, such as L-
validity and P-validity, L-equipollence and P-equipollence, and L- and P-synonymy.) 
Both kinds of “translation rules” are to be employed in physicalization.  
                                                
5 The only writers I know of who explicitly do not hold the analytic entailment interpretation are 
Alston and Nakhnikian (1963, p. 391), Hempel (1958, 1969), Cirera (1993) and Kim (2003). I am 
grateful to my colleague Thomas Uebel for drawing my attention to Cirera’s important article as well 
as to Hempel (1969) and much other relevant literature, as well as for many edifying discussions of 
Carnap and logical positivism, which prompted several changes this to chapter.  
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In Philosophy and Logical Syntax (1935/1963), Carnap claims that “every sentence 
of any branch of scientific language is equipollent to some sentence of the physical 
language, and can therefore be translated into the physical language without changing 
its content” (p. 455; cf. The Logical Syntax of Language §82). Carnap is very clear in 
this work (as well as in The Logical Syntax of Language §§51, 82) that there can be 
two concepts of equipollence, that is, equivalence, in the physical language: logical 
equipollence (L-equipollence) and physical equipollence (P-equipollence). Two 
sentences are L-equipollent when they are mutually derivable solely on the basis of 
logical laws; two sentences are P-equipollent when they are mutually derivable only 
on the basis of physical laws as well.  
Given this distinction between L- and P-concepts, in order for the legendary 
analytic entailment interpretation to be true, Carnap would have to maintain that all 
physical translations of psychological sentences are L-equipollent to them. But he did 
not maintain this. He explicitly allowed a psychological sentence, Q1, and a physical 
translation of it, Q2, to be P-equivalent, as Q1 could be transformed into Q2 on the 
basis of “a scientific law, that is, a universal sentence belonging to the valid sentences 
of the scientific language-system” (1935/1963, p. 456). He took some pains to point 
out that, in his view, this universal sentence “need not be analytic; the only 
assumption is that it is valid. It may be synthetic, in which case it is P-valid” 
(ibidem).6 Similarly, with respect to the translation of the psychological statement 
‘Mr. A is now excited’ (P1), Carnap (1932/1959) says that it 
                                                
6 In a letter he wrote to Herbert Feigl in 1933 (translated by and quoted in Feigl 1963, p. 255), Carnap 
exlicitly states that the two sentences are not analytic. He offers two translations of ‘N. has a visual 
image of a house’ (A), ‘The organism of N. is in the state of house-imagining’ (B1) and ‘In the 
organism of N. there is an electrochemical condition of such a kind (described in terms of 
electrochemistry)’ (B2), and then remarks that: 
Both B1 and B2 are translations of A. According to my recently adopted terminology, I assert: A is 
equivalent (“gehaltgleich”) to both statements … ; viz., L-equivalent (logically equivalent) with B1; 
but P-equivalent (physically equivalent) with B2, i.e., mutually translatable (derivable) using 
besides the logical laws also natural laws as rules of inference, incorporated as transformation rules 
in the scientific language. You are therefore right in saying that B2 is only synthetically equivalent 
with A. 
As Ramon Cirera (1993) importantly points out, while B1, unlike B2, is claimed by Carnap to be L-
equivalent to A, it is not behavioural —in fact, it is not even physical. Neither Feigl nor Cirera say 
what the point of B1 is. One possibility is that it is an adverbial analysis of (A) intended to avoid 
commitment to the intentional object apparently designated by the phrase ‘visual image of a house’, 
and hence to avoid intentional language, thus making the ultimate goal of a physical translation into B2 
easier. Such adverbial techniques were sometimes employed by Russell in order to avoid commitment 
to intentional objects (and by some of the American New Realists in a quasi-behaviourist spirit) and 
Russell of course influenced Carnap. Chisholm (1955-56) famously criticized such adverbial strategies 
for avoiding intentional language but I know of no response by Carnap to Chisholm on this point.   
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“cannot, indeed, today be translated into a physical sentence P3 of the form “such and such 
a physico-chemical process is now taking place in A’s body” (expressed by a specification 
of physical state-coordinates and by chemical formulae). Our current knowledge of 
physiology is not adequate for this purpose” (1932/1959, p. 175). 
 
It goes without saying that Carnap did not view knowledge of physiology as a priori. 
It is lack of a posteriori knowledge of physiology that prevents P1 from being 
translated into P3. It follows, of course, that the relation between P1 and P3 is 
synthetic, not analytic.  
It might be objected that it is simply not true that, in order for the analytic 
entailment thesis to hold, all physical translations of psychological sentences must be 
L-equivalent to them. It is only required that the physical-behavioural ones be L- 
equivalent. What Carnap has in mind here is the case in which Q2 is a non-
behavioural, neurophysiological sentence. This of course can only be P-equivalent. 
But that is entirely consistent with claiming that a behavioural sentence, Q3, must be 
L-equivalent with the psychological sentence of which it is a translation. Moreover, 
this fits nicely with the logical positivists’ view (emphasized by Feigl (1958)) that the 
progress of the science of psychology will unfold in two stages: an initial 
“peripheralist” black-box behaviouristic stage and a later “centralist” 
neurophysiological stage.  
Carnap does indeed countenance physicalizations that are explicitly only about 
overt behaviour. In ‘Psychology in Physical Language’, he says that P1 (‘Mr. A is 
now excited’) may be inferred from p1, which is a sentence “about the behaviour of A, 
e.g. about his facial expressions, his gestures, etc. or about physical effects of A’s 
behaviour, e.g. about characteristics of his handwriting” (id., p. 171). The question is 
whether Carnap intends P1 and p1 to be L-equivalent, as the analytic entailment 
interpretation requires, or whether they are supposed to be merely P-equivalent — just 
as P1 and P3 are. Although he does not employ L- and P-concepts explicitly in 
‘Psychology’, it is nonetheless clear that the logical relation between P1 and p1 is 
synthetic and therefore that the two are intended to be at best P-equivalent.7 For he 
tells us that P1 is to be derived from p1 on the basis of the “major premise O,” which 
states that “When I perceive a person to have this facial expression and hand-writing 
                                                
7 And perhaps not even that, owing to the fact that the connection between the two may not even be 
nomological, as we shall see presently.  
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he (usually) turns out to be excited. (A sentence about the expressional or 
graphological signs of excitement.)” (ibidem.). Earlier in the paper, Carnap draws a 
distinction between singular and general scientific — including psychological — 
sentences (id., p. 168), taking pains to emphasize (against what he calls 
“phenomenology” and its objectionable a priori or at least non-inductive methods) 
that general sentences are discovered inductively and are therefore to be considered 
empirical hypotheses (ibidem.). He then explicitly says that the major premise O, on 
the basis of which P1 is derived from p1, is such a general sentence (id., p. 171). O’s 
synthetic status (as an empirical inductive hypothesis) is therefore beyond question. It 
follows that the connection between P1 and p1 is synthetic too; generalizing, the 
connection between psychological sentences and their behavioural protocols is, 
contrary to the analytic entailment interpretation, synthetic.  
This is further highlighted by what Carnap goes on to say: 
 
“The cited relationship between P1 and p1 may also be seen in the fact that under certain 
circumstances, the inference from p1 to P1 may go astray. It may happen that, although p1 
occurs in a protocol, I am obliged, on the grounds of further protocols, to retract the 
established system sentence P1. I would then say something like, ‘I made a mistake. The 
test has shown that A was not excited, even though his face had such and such an 
expression’” (ibidem).  
 
Similarly, five years later in ‘Logical Foundations of the Unity of Science’, he writes: 
 
“Let us take as an example the term ‘angry’. If for anger we knew a sufficient and 
necessary criterion to be found by a physiological analysis of the nervous system or other 
organs, then we could define ‘angry’ in terms of the biological language. The same holds 
if we knew such a criterion to be determined by the observation of the overt, external 
behaviour. But a physiological criterion is not yet known. And the peripheral symptoms 
known are presumably not necessary criteria because it might be that a person of strong 
self-control is able to suppress these symptoms. If this is the case, the term ‘angry’ is, at 
least at the present time, not definable in terms of the biological language. But, 
nevertheless, it is reducible to such terms. … The logical nature of the psychological terms 
becomes clear by an analogy with those physical terms which are introduced by reduction 
statements of the conditional form. Terms of both kinds designate a state characterized by 
the disposition to certain reactions. In both cases the state is not the same as those 
reactions. Anger is not the same as the movements by which an angry organism reacts to 
the conditions in his environment, just as the state of being electrically charged is not the 
same as the process of attracting other bodies. In both cases, that state sometimes occurs 
without these events which are observable from outside; they are consequences of the state 
according to certain laws and may therefore under suitable circumstances be taken as 
symptoms for it; but they are not identical with it (Carnap, 1938, pp. 56-57, 59).8 
                                                
8 Hempel’s discussion in ‘The Logical Analysis of Psychology’ (1935, esp. §V) is considerably less 
clear about this, and this lack of clarity may well have contributed to the legend, especially given that 
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We shall return to Carnap’s important distinction between definition and reduction 
below (in §3) because it is highly relevant to explaining the origins of the legend. For 
the moment, however, let us note that Carnap here anticipates and pre-empts 
Putnam’s super-spartan objection by more than two decades, explicitly stating that he 
does not view the behavioural dispositions associated with anger as identical with it; 
on the contrary, the behavioural “symptoms” of anger are (normally) caused by anger. 
This is already clear in ‘Psychology’ for, as we saw above, he considers the general 
sentence O to state behavioural “signs” of excitement — in other words, “symptoms,” 
that is, causal effects of excitement, noting that they may be present even when 
excitement is not.9 In this he also anticipates the later causal critiques of behaviourism 
levelled by Jerry Fodor and David Armstrong (that mental events are not identical 
with behaviour but are the causes of behaviour). The central point, again, is the fact 
that even here, with an explicitly overt-behavioural proposal, Carnap does not declare 
that such an overt-behaviouristic reduction sentence for anger will be analytic. The 
“laws” referred to, connecting inner states with outer behavioural reactions or 
symptoms, are empirical physical laws and so are intended to be P-valid (at best) and 
so synthetic.  
Jaegwon Kim (2003, p. 275), however, sees Carnap as anticipating a causal-
functional analysis of mental concepts and so as lending support to the idea that while 
Carnap may have viewed the nomological correlation of psychological sentences with 
neurophysiological sentences as P-equivalent, he viewed the correlation of 
psychological sentences with behavioural sentences as L-equivalent and hence 
analytic. Now, it is true, I think, that Carnap does here anticipate—remarkably—a 
                                                                                                                                       
Hempel’s article is more widely reprinted than Carnap’s ‘Psychology’ (it appears, e.g., in the highly 
influential collection Readings in Philosophical Analysis (Feigl and Sellars 1949)). Hempel there 
confusingly claims that it is logically contradictory to say that all the symptoms obtain but the 
psychological state does not. This seems to be because, first, unlike Carnap, he is using the term 
‘symptoms’ (sometimes putting it between inverted commas) to cover not only the external behavior 
but also the internal physiological processes associated with the psychological state, and, second, he is 
heading off a dualist objection. Still, given that Hempel maintains that all these “symptoms” are 
discovered empirically (cf. note 21 below), he cannot really mean that their presence with the absence 
of the psychological state is logically contradictory. Rather, the sentence describing such a situation 
would be (at best) what Carnap (1934, §52) calls P-contravalid (i.e., nomologically impossible). 
Hempel’s confusion here may be of a piece with the one Feigl and others make about the nature of 
definition, as discussed below in §3.  
9 The inner event of excitement that is the cause of the outer behavioural symptom is eventually to be 
identified with the inner neurophysiological state that is the cause of the behavioural symptom, à la 
later causal-role functionalism. See immediately below for more on this.  
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kind of functionalism. However, contrary to what Kim says, it is, I think, incorrect to 
associate Carnap with the analytic functionalism of David Lewis and others, which is 
really a development of Rylean ordinary-language logical/analytical behaviourism. 
According to analytic functionalism, the causal-functional definitions of mental terms 
are specified a priori by conceptual analysis of commonsense psychology, and the 
only role for empirical science is to discover a posteriori which inner states are the 
actual physical realizers of the definitions. Carnap’s proto-functionalism is, I believe, 
more akin to an thorough-going empirical psycho-functionalism (Block 1978), in 
which empirical science is involved at the first stage; that is, the functional definitions 
of mental terms are themselves in many cases specified empirically by scientific 
investigation.  
In a word, Carnap’s proto-functionalism is what one might call synthetic 
functionalism. This fits the text and the spirit of ‘Psychology’ and ‘Foundations’ 
better, to make better sense of the strong analogy Carnap draws between concept 
formation in the natural sciences and in the sciences of psychology, and to gel better 
with Carnap’s (1932) procedure of physicalization.10 This was certainly Hempel’s 
view of Carnap, who maintained that for the latter “those behavioural symptoms 
which are generally associated with a given psychological feature will often be 
determined by empirical investigations leading to empirical laws rather than by an 
aprioristic reflection upon the meaning of the psychological terms in question” 
(Hempel, 1969, pp. 179-180).11  
                                                
10 I discuss Carnap’s empirical procedure of physicalization in slightly more detail in Crawford (2013).  
11 Moreover, as Carnap himself later pointed out (1952, p. 71) — and as is noted by Hempel (1951, p. 
72; 1952, p. 28) and Arthur Pap (1958, ch. 11) — if there is more than one partial or conditional 
definition, e.g., a pair of (either unilateral or bilateral) reduction sentences for a given term, as 
obviously Carnap expected their to be for theoretical termsof behavioural psychology, then one can 
derive a synthetic statement from them, from which it follows that at least one of the definitions must 
be synthetic. See Carnap (1936-7) for the notion of a reduction sentence. I discuss the difference 
between reduction and definition in §3 below. Carnap (1952) ingeniously goes on to suggest a 
procedure to overcome the fact that pairs of reduction sentences introducing a theoretical term will 
have synthetic consequences, by taking a weaker (material) conditional sentence, whose antecedent is a 
statement of the empirical content of the reduction pair (the “representative sentence,” as he (1936-7) 
called it) and whose consequent is the reduction pair, as the “meaning postulate” introducing the 
theoretical term, because none of its logical consequences containing only the original defining (basic) 
terms are synthetic. However, it is important to note for present purposes that while none of these 
logical consequences are synthetic, they are analytic only in the narrow sense, that is, they are logical 
truths. Such meaning postulates cannot therefore underwrite behavioural definitions for psychological 
terms in the spirit of textbook logical/analytical behaviourism, which obviously requires a broader 
notion of analyticity. See immediately below for further relevant discussion of this point.  
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In short, Carnap went the whole hog: most — perhaps all — of the semantic 
relations between both psychological sentences and neurophysiological sentences, 
and psychological sentences and physical-behavioural sentences, were synthetic.  
Indeed, there is strong reason to doubt that in the period with which we are 
concerned — circa 1930-1940 — Carnap could even have held onto any analytic 
entailments between psychological and behavioural statements, even if he had wanted 
to. To see this, we need only remember the distinction between the narrow and the 
broad notion of analyticity, famously emphasized by Quine (1951) in “Two Dogmas”. 
In the narrow sense, an analytic truth is a logical truth, that is, a truth based solely on 
the meanings of the logical constants, such as the tautology “If p then p”; such a 
logical truth remains true under all “re-interpretations” of the meanings of its non-
logical terms (such logical truths are now more commonly called logically valid 
sentences or formulae). An analytic truth in the broad sense is a truth based solely on 
the meanings of the logical terms and the non-logical or “descriptive” terms; an “all-
bachelors-are-unmarried” kind of truth, as it were. The analyticity of these latter 
“truths of essential predication”, as Quine (1963) calls them (apparently after Mill), 
lies in the fact that they can be transformed into logical truths by substitution of 
definitions or synonymies. It is, of course, the broad notion of analyticity that is at 
stake here; no one ever claimed that logical behaviourists thought the entailments 
between psychological and physical-behavioural sentences were tautological or 
trivially logically true. But this crucial distinction between the broad and the narrow 
senses of analyticity seems to have occurred to Carnap only after 1940 and some late 
remarks by him (Carnap 1964/1994, p. 259) seem to suggest that it was Quine who 
woke him from his dogmatic Wittgensteinian slumbers (according to which 
analyticity just is logical truth) that he began to distinguish explicitly between logical 
truth and analyticity in the broader sense and attempt to define the latter as well as the 
former.12  
I cannot be wholly definite here. The received view has it that it was only later, 
spurred by Quine’s attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction in “Two Dogmas” and 
his drawing there of the distinction between logical truth in the narrow sense and 
analyticity in the broader all-bachelors-are-married sense, that Carnap undertook the 
                                                
12 Actually, as Quine points out in “Two Dogmas” (§1, p. 41), even in the modal-logic phase of 
Meaning and Necessity (Carnap 1947) in his later “semantic period”, when he defined analytic truth 
semantically as truth in all state descriptions, Carnap’s definition was still only of the narrower notion 
of analyticity as logical truth. 
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task of characterizing analyticity in the broader sense. Accordingly, Carnap first 
proposed to define the broader sense of analyticity for an artificial observational 
language in “Meaning Postulates” (Carnap 1952), which is repeated in chapter 27 of 
An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science (Carnap (1966/94), and for an artificial 
theoretical language in chapter 28 of that same work; and his proposal for natural 
languages first appears in “Meaning and Synonymy in Natural Languages” (Carnap 
1955; see also Carnap’s reply to Hempel in the Schilpp volume).13 Be that as it may, 
however, it suffices for the present argument that during the time in which Carnap 
formed his views on the philosophy of psychology under discussion here (roughly, the 
late 1920s to the late 1930s) he did equate analyticity with logical truth and so could 
not have endorsed textbook logical behaviourism.  
 
3. Origins of the Legend 
So how on earth did the analytic entailment interpretation ever get started in the first 
place?  
One source of the legend, which time limitations prevent me from exploring in any 
detail, is probably the often-drawn analogy with phenomenalism and logical 
constructionism. We have already seen Putnam claim that logical behaviourism was a 
logical constructionist thesis akin to the construction of numbers out of sets—and 
obviously the latter construction will involve exclusive use of L-rules. Similarly, if 
one thinks of phenomenalism as the doctrine that material-object statements 
analytically entail sense-data statements—as for example in Chisholm (1957, 
Appendix)—and one thinks logical behaviourism is like phenomenalism, then one 
will no doubt arrive at the analytic entailment interpretation. But as we have seen, it is 
simply a mistake to view the logical positivists’ logical behaviourism as like 
phenomenalism, or more generally logical constructionism, in this sense.14  
                                                
13 Awodey (2007, p. 244n 30) endorses this take on the matter, which does indeed seem to be Carnap’s 
own view, at least in some of his later writings (e.g., Carnap 1964/1994, p. 259). It is absolutely clear, 
however, despite what Carnap says in these writings, that he was alive to the importance of the 
distinction between narrow logical truth and broad analyticity as far back as 1943 (and probably 
earlier). See, e.g., the letter Carnap wrote to Quine on 21 January, 1943 (printed in Creath 1992, pp. 
303ff). The nature and development of Carnap’s views on how to define formally the difference 
between narrow analyticity as logical truth and broad analyticity as essential predication has not to my 
knowledge been studied in detail let alone resolved in a fully satisfying manner. I hope to discuss it in 
future work.  
14 Unless—ironically—one is explicitly thinking of Carnap’s (as opposed, e.g., to A. J. Ayer’s) 
phenomenalism and logical constructionism. See note 2 above. So while there is a parallel between 
Carnap’s phenomenalism/logical constructionism and logical behaviourism, it is precisely the opposite 
 13 
More importantly, we can trace the origin of the analytic entailment interpretation 
largely to the positivists’ highly technical and idiosyncratically use of the expressions 
“translation,” “meaning,” “synonymy,” “definition” and their cognates. None of these 
terms is used today in anything like the way the logical positivists, especially Carnap 
and Hempel, were using them in the 1930s and even to some extent in the 1940s. 15 
Most of these terms and their cognates have strong modal implications for us now that 
they did not have back then for the positivists, namely a degree of intensionality up to 
at least logical necessity and perhaps even hyperintensionality. Carnap and Hempel, 
however, were working with a background extensional logic. When they claim that 
“mind talk” can be translated into “physical talk,” what they mean is that one can 
construct material bi-conditionals with mind talk on the left-hand side and physical-
thing-language talk on the right-hand side. These material bi-conditional 
“translations” were just that—material bi-conditionals, containing the straightforward 
truth functional connective symbolized by the horseshoe. Most of these material bi-
conditionals (and reduction sentences) were clearly understood at the outset to be 
synthetic statements of lawful correlations discovered by empirically through 
scientific investigation. Carnap (1956) is especially clear about this. Of course, 
philosophers of science, including Carnap himself (1936/37), soon began to realize 
the extreme difficulties they faced in formalizing natural laws, disposition statements, 
and the counterfactual conditionals associated with them using an extensional logic.16 
In light of this, Hempel remarks on one alternative approach that appeals to empirical 
causal laws: “The extensional ‘if … then …’ — which requires neither logical nor 
nomological necessity of connection — would therefore have to be replaced … by a 
stricter, nomological counterpart which might be worded perhaps as ‘if … then, with 
causal necessity, …’” (Hempel 1958, p. 188).  
The most significant instance of this confusion of extensional and intensional 
semantic concepts as applied to the philosophy of psychology seems to occur in the 
work of the ambivalent and erstwhile logical positivist Herbert Feigl; and I conjecture 
that it is perpetuated and carried into contemporary analytic philosophy of mind’s 
self-image through the Feigl-Putnam-Fodor line of influence. Early on in his famous 
                                                                                                                                       
of what that parallel is usually taken to be. Carnap’s phenomenalism and his behaviourism were both 
synthetic.  
15 Ducasse (1941, ch. 7) complains that what Carnap (1935/63) calls translation is not truly translation.  
16 See Carnap (1956), Hempel (1958) and Suppe (1977) for discussion of this.  
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long essay, ‘The “Mental” and the “Physical”’, Feigl explains the transition from 
logical behaviourism to the mind-brain identity theory: 
 
A most important logical requirement for the analysis of the mind-body problem is the 
recognition of the synthetic or empirical character of the statements regarding the 
correlation of psychological to neuro-physiological states. It has been pointed out time and 
again that the early reductionistic logical behaviorism failed to produce an adequate and 
plausible construal of mentalistic concepts by explicit definition on the basis of purely 
behavioral concepts. … I was tempted to identify, in the sense of logical identity, the 
mental with the neurophysiological …  
But if this theory is understood as holding a logical translatability (analytic 
transformability) of statements in the one language into statements in the other, this will 
certainly not do. … 
[T]he question which mental states correspond to which cerebral states is in some sense 
… an empirical question. If this were not so, the intriguing and very unfinished science of 
psychophysiology could be pursued and completed by purely a priori reasoning. … 
… Subjective experience … cannot be logically identical with states of the organism; 
i.e., phenomenal terms could not explicitly be defined on the basis of physical1 or 
physical2 terms. (1958, pp. 389-90).  
 
Aside from encouraging the erroneous view that early reductionistic logical 
behaviourism was purely overt-behavioural, excluding reference to inner 
neurophysiological states, while his own early view (Feigl 1950) included them, Feigl 
runs together two crucially different things: analyticity and definability.17 He assumes 
that an explicit definition cannot be synthetic but can only be analytic and 
consequently assumes that abandoning the idea of explicit definition is tantamount to 
embracing the idea that the connection between what was originally the definiendum 
and definiens is synthetic.18 But these assumptions are mistaken.  
According to Carnap and Hempel, if a non-primitive expression, the definiendum, 
is explicitly definable in terms of primitive expressions, then it can be eliminated and 
replaced by its definiens, by the primitive expressions. Such explicit definitions were 
understood by Carnap and Hempel to be the specification of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the definiendum; that is, the construction of a material bi-conditional 
whose right-hand side, the definiens, contains only undefined primitive terms.19 For 
the logical positivists, of course, the defined expressions — in our case, mental ones 
                                                
17 It must be conceded that Hempel (1935, §V) may not have been altogether free of this conflation 
either. See note 8 above.  
18 Cf. Feigl (1958), pp. 427, 447, as well as Feigl (1963), p. 251 and Feigl (1971), p. 302. Pap (1952, p. 
210) and Laurence D. Smith (1986, p. 53) also seem to hold these mistaken assumptions.  
19 Strictly speaking, only the ultimate definition in a definition chain will have only undefined 
primitive terms in the definiens, but this does not affect the present point. See Carnap (1936-7) and 
Hempel (1952).  
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— will be so-called “theoretical” terms and the primitive expressions the 
“observation” terms — in our case, physical-behavioural ones. Now, Carnap (1936-
37) very early on saw that the search for explicit definitions of all empirical scientific 
terms in the physical-thing language, on the basis of which physical translations could 
be carried out, was misconceived—especially in the case of dispositional terms—and 
consequently weakened the project to one of providing what he called “reduction 
sentences,” which were either material conditionals with further material conditionals 
as consequents or material conditions with material bi-conditionals as consequents.20 
These reduction-sentence conditionals linked the empirical term in question to 
physical conditions only under certain test circumstances. Since these physical 
reduction sentences were not definitions of the terms they were reducing—they were 
only incomplete “conditional definitions”—they did not allow the terms to be 
eliminated and replaced and hence they could not form the basis for translations.21  
The important point for present purposes about this shift from definition to 
reduction or partial definition is that, with respect to the physicalization of psychology 
and other empirical sciences, it is not a shift from the category of analytic truths 
knowable only a priori to the category of synthetic truths knowable only a posteriori. 
Rather, it is a shift within the single category of synthetic truths knowable only a 
posteriori from complete definability (which permits elimination of the defined term) 
to incomplete or conditional definability (which does not permit elimination of the 
partially defined term). Contrary to what Feigl and others seem to suppose, the failure 
of explicit definition and translation is not at all tantamount to the failure of a priori 
analytic definition and translation. As we saw in §2, there never was any such latter 
project for psychology or indeed any empirical science.  
The mistaken assumption that explicit definitions are all and only strongly 
intensional up to analyticity seems to have been abetted by misinterpretations of the 
addenda that Carnap and Hempel added to later reprintings of their respective articles. 
The addenda to Carnap (1932) and Hempel (1935) state that the two philosophers no 
                                                
20 See Carnap (1936-37), §10 and Hempel (1952). 
21 Moreover, as Hempel makes clear, even if necessary and sufficient observational conditions for a 
theoretical term could be discovered inductively for a merely partially defined theoretical term 
introduced by reduction sentences, the bi-conditional representing this finding, ‘Q iff O’, where ‘Q’ is 
the theoretical term and ‘O’ the observational one, “clearly does not express a synonymy; if it did, no 
empirical investigations would be needed in the first place to establish it. Rather, it states that, as a 
matter of empirical fact, ‘O’ is co-extensive with ‘Q’, or, that O is an empirically necessary and 
sufficient condition for Q” (Hempel 1958, p. 192). But see note 8 above.  
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longer hold the strict definability thesis and have replaced it with the more flexible 
reducibility thesis.22 In his 1977 “prefatory note” to the reprinting in Block (1980), 
Hempel tells us that he had reservations about agreeing to the reprinting because he 
no longer held the “narrow translationist form of physicalism [there] set forth” but 
“yielded to Dr. Block’s plea that it offers a concise account of an early version of 
logical behaviourism” (p. 14). On Kim’s interpretation, this implies that “Hempel was 
in agreement with Block’s assessment that logical behaviourism was the position 
advocated in his 1935 paper” (2003, p. 266). Since Kim understands logical 
behaviourism as the thesis that psychological sentences analytically entail physical-
behavioural sentences—in other words, since Kim holds the analytic entailment 
interpretation—he is claiming that Hempel is implying that he (Hempel) advocated 
the latter thesis in his original article. Kim goes on to point out how problematic 
Hempel’s note is so interpreted because hardly any of Hempel’s (1935) proffered 
physical-behavioural conditions are analytically entailed by his sample psychological 
sentence ‘Paul has a toothache’.23 But there is no such implication. There is absolutely 
nothing in Hempel’s note to suggest he understood early logical behaviourism as the 
thesis that psychological sentences analytically entail physical-behavioural sentences. 
Kim’s interpretation can be arrived at only on the assumption that explicit definitions 
are analytic. But Hempel was never under any such illusion. On the contrary, he is 
clear that he understands his early version of logical behaviourism to be the claim that 
psychological concepts are explicitly definable in physical terms and his point is that 
he has now moved to the more liberal thesis of reduction. Both the earlier definitions 
and the later reductions were synthetic.24 Carnap’s addendum makes exactly the same 
point.25 
                                                
22 See Carnap’s 1957 addendum to the reprinting of Carnap (1932) in Ayer (1959), Carnap’s 1961 
addenda to the reprinting of Carnap (1932) in Alston and Nakhnikian (1963), Carnap’s preface to the 
second edition of the Aufbau (Carnap 1928/61), and Hempel’s 1972 ‘Author’s preamble’ to the 
reprinting of Hempel (1935) in Marras (1972, p. 115), which are all but identical to the 1977 ‘Author’s 
prefatory note’ to the reprinting in Block (1980). As Hempel notes in his addenda, physicalization was 
liberalized even further with the later introduction of “hypothetical constructs” connected to the 
observation language via “correspondence rules.” See also Carnap (1956) and Hempel (1951, 1952, 
1958).  
23 See Crawford (2013) for more detail. 
24 Although, again, as discussed in note 8 above, Hempel (1935) is admittedly not entirely clear about 
this. 
25 Moreover, to come full circle, the first of the two main changes Carnap announces in the preface to 
the second edition of the Aufbau (the second being the one discussed by Chalmers and Leitgeb which I 
mentioned at the outset, namely, the shift from extensionality to either logical or nomological 
intensionality) is the “realization that the reduction of higher level concepts to lower level ones cannot 
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Echoing Donald Davidson’s famous remark about language, I think we may 
conclude that there is no such thing as the logical behaviourism of the logical 
positivists, not if logical behaviourism is anything like what most philosophers have 
supposed. 
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